For
K. Subrahmanyam, father
and
Aravinda R. Deo, mentor

Preface

‘Wisdom is to live in tune with the mode of the changing world’

– THIRUVALLUVAR

It was unsettling to discover after four decades as a professional diplomat that many of the assumptions on which we had operated were now being called into question. But it did not follow from there that our experiences were suddenly irrelevant. On the contrary, it seemed that those who could most objectively assess the last many decades were best placed to anticipate the coming times. Seeking truth from facts is, however, not easy. If the pressure of political correctness is one challenge, the weight of accumulated dogma is no less. An equally difficult reconciliation is that between an adequate awareness of the global context, and yet viewing it from a hard-headed national perspective. This has been a persistent dilemma since Independence and the era of nationalism has only sharpened it further. These are some issues of an endeavour that has occupied me for the last two years.

In many ways, it was natural to put pen to paper on the subjects around which my life has revolved. An unpublished PhD thesis and an in-house history of the Indo-US nuclear deal provided some confidence to do so. Thus, it came about that after my tenure as Foreign Secretary ended in 2018, this initiative began through a fellowship with the Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore. If the project kept changing form and content thereafter, much of that reflected the rapid pace of events in the world we live in. At some stage, I put aside the temptation of bringing in any aspects of a memoir, believing that they are better written by those who are no longer operational. Instead, my effort was to develop an argumentation on contemporary politics through interactions in different forums, keeping them as analytical and dispassionate as possible.

Looking at the world over these four decades from key vantage points was truly helpful in arriving at a detached view of its risks and possibilities. A professional initiation in Moscow taught me valuable lessons in great power politics, some perhaps unintended. Four stints dealing with the United States created a lasting interest in a polity whose confidence and resilience are quite unique. A long stay in Japan was an education in the nuances of East Asia, as indeed in the unrealized potential of our ties. And a shorter one in Singapore brought out the importance of adjusting to global happenings. Postings in Prague and Budapest heightened sensitivity to the currents of history. An absorbing but difficult tour in Sri Lanka was an invaluable politico-military experience. But, if there was one great learning, that was in a China that I caught at an inflection point in 2009. As Ambassador there, subsequently in the US, and then as Foreign Secretary, I have had a ringside view of recent global changes. Above all, interacting with our own leadership over many years at different levels of hierarchy had a value that is difficult to put in words. From that, the big takeaways were the importance of defining strategic goals, recognizing optimal outcomes and appreciating the interplay of politics and policy.

This book was developed in the course of the last two years through a series of events. Lectures given at think tanks, conferences or business forums form its core. They remain relevant in large measure but have been updated where required. ‘The Lessons of Awadh’ is a fusion of comments on various such occasions. ‘The Art of the Disruption’ draws on addresses to the Oslo Energy Forum, the Raisina Dialogue, the Sir Bani Yas Forum and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. ‘Krishna’s Choice’ was articulated in its essence at the Sai Foundation, New Delhi. ‘The Dogmas of Delhi’ is an expanded version of the Fourth Ramnath Goenka Memorial Lecture. ‘Of Mandarins and Masses’ is a hybrid of talks at St Stephen’s College, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Birmingham and the Atlantic Council. ‘The Nimzo Indian Defence’ is based on a lecture delivered in Singapore. ‘A Delayed Destiny’ combines discussions at the Delhi Policy Group, India Foundation and the India International Centre. ‘The Pacific Indian’ owes its articulation to three Indian Ocean Conferences organized by the India Foundation and one by the National Maritime Foundation. And ‘After the Virus’ builds on recent speeches starting with the Fifth Raisina Dialogue 2020, taking into account the impact of the pandemic.

To the organizations that provided a platform to formulate and express my thoughts, I am profoundly grateful. Audience responses were helpful in developing the argumentation. If propositions are sometimes deliberately sharpened, it is only with an intention to set minds at work. Global developments are clearly the overarching context for an exercise in which our national performance is assessed. The coronavirus epidemic is not only a reminder of this reality but also a harbinger of changes that the world will now experience. To appreciate its consequences, what we require at home is a dispassionate debate that rises above competitive politics.

I am in debt to all those who have contributed to the making of this volume, especially an irreverent family, long suffering friends and argumentative colleagues. A special word of thanks to Radhika, Guru, Rajesh and Ramesh without whom these views would have never found expression. My publishers, especially Krishan Chopra, have been very patient as the fate of the book was linked to the twists and turns in my own life. I hope that their forbearance is rewarded.

1

The Lessons of Awadh

The Dangers of Strategic Complacency

‘The heaviest penalty for declining to rule is to be ruled by someone inferior’

– PLATO

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NOTES

*Shyam Saran, ‘China in the 21st Century’, Second Annual K. Subrahmanyam Lecture, India International Centre, New Delhi, 2012.

**Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon (New York: Henry Holt, 2015).

*P.C. Bagchi, India and China: A Thousand Years of Cultural Relations (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2008).

*Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (London: Hurst, 2015).

After the Virus

An Epilogue

‘The world is a great gymnasium where we come to make ourselves strong’

– SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

Even otherwise, our world was moving discernibly towards an era of greater disruption, stronger nationalism, sharper competitiveness and a questioning of rules and regimes. And along came a virus that first devastated Wuhan and then proceeded to engulf the entire world. Quite apart from the enormous number of deaths it caused, millions have lost their livelihood across nations. Societies that were confident of their future saw the prospect of growth evaporate before their very eyes. Many, not just in India, who would have otherwise come out of poverty will have to wait longer. And all this because of a pandemic of which they had little knowledge and even less control. Considering its enormous impact, it cannot be that this extraordinary happening will be absorbed so easily by the world. Debates around it have broken out, sharpening arguments that were already in play. As a result, the pace of what was already underway will surely accelerate. Global contradictions will accentuate as geopolitics and geo-economics get more heated. Many characteristics of our turbulent era will get validated, perhaps even enhanced. And new wrinkles will be added to a more complicated world.

Partly because of how the pandemic unfolded, it has fed strongly into a US-China dynamic that is in flux. As it is, this particular relationship was busy grappling with issues of ambitions, intentions and interests. An American view of economic security being central to national security had put pressure on offshoring practices and global supply chains, while also enhancing technology sensitivity. But after the coronavirus, there is now an additional layer of health security being added to the mix. The availability of medicines, masks, personal protective equipment and testing kits during the pandemic graphically brought out national vulnerabilities across the world. How much post-pandemic sentiment would affect business judgements, especially on global supply chains, is therefore a natural concern. A shift in American thinking that goes beyond the Administration of the day now believes that a single-minded pursuit of efficiency and profits at the cost of the social fabric and industrial capabilities is unacceptable. Particularly in a climate of disrupted travel and health uncertainty, the risks of doing business abroad have increased. If, at the same time, policy uncertainty is also heightened, there will be much more pressure on the world that we know.

Even accepting that businesses are more deeply rooted than policy debates often suggest, it is hard to deny that the post-corona world will be very different. Comparatively at least, we will see more de-globalization, regionalization, de-coupling, self-reliance and shorter supply chains. As conversations about them get more animated, there is less pretence that we are also talking about the parallel world of political influence. Trade has never been without its politics and technology had provided a further overlay. The pandemic has now given this a more distinct edge. The relative merits of costs, risk and resilience in a globalized economy has become a more energized debate. It not only focuses on geographical dependence but sectoral ones as well. As a result, a greater awareness of strategic autonomy in the economic sphere has started to develop. In parallel, the concept of trusted partners has moved beyond the technology domain to a larger definition. As the ambit of what is perceived as security and sufficiency broadens, so too will the political connotations that surround it. Arguments about the nature of governance have also come more alive in this context. The prospect of parallel universes in different domains may have become stronger as a result. Whether it would all actually lead to a serious degree of ‘decoupling’ is the great imponderable. Trade dependency in itself is also becoming a more sensitive matter. Over the last decade, we have seen it used as a pressure point on occasions. As this recurs more often, it will induce a greater caution about the strategic nature of trade engagement.

The irony of the entrenched power being revolutionary and the rising one defending selective elements of the status quo has already been noted. As pressures increase, the contestation could become serious and create new narratives. Already, there has been a shift from marketing peaceful rise to declaring the arrival of wolf warriors. We may see much more of this on all sides. In many ways, the role reversal in world affairs will be even more stunning after the virus. The sense of victimhood is also visibly shifting location. Concerns about dependency and insecurity about dominance is similarly changing.

If the virus has aggravated differences and further politicized the economy, its impact on self-interest is no less. Corona nationalism is now its latest incarnation. During the pandemic, we have seen nations pursue their health security goals with little regard for the welfare of others. Some used their economic clout openly, while others forgot their regional solidarity. The few exceptions that did happen really did not compensate for this broad behavioural pattern. Now, much of that could be attributed to the panic generated by the virus. But what it did bring out was how international relations is practised in reality. If collective endeavours fray so quickly under stress, their future is clearly less than assured in an era of sustained pressure.

This then brings us to the state of multilateralism. That it could not rise effectively to the occasion has hardly enhanced its stature. Quite apart from controversies in that domain, there was little visible leadership when it came to defining the agenda or setting directions. What it reminds us is that the quality of multilateralism is eventually dependent on the extent of consensus among major powers. And that, as we all know, has been in short supply for some time. As a result, bodies and agendas have themselves become a trial of strength rather than a common landing zone. Striking a balance between national interest and global good has become harder as conversations focus more on influencing institutions. As a consequence, plurilateralism will be the beneficiary because it has a purpose and commonality now found wanting in multilateralism. The pursuit of resilient supply chains, especially in the health domain, could well be added to its growing agenda.

Leave alone multilateralism, even our understanding of globalization has changed as a result of recent developments. Till now, the common approach was to view it as a balance of multiple national interests, rather than an outcome of collective choice. Its economic perspectives were dominant, with primacy given to trade and investment. But as with the case of climate change or terrorism, pandemics have now demonstrated that there are issues on which no one can really stay out. Such realities cannot be a subject of calculations or negotiations as they reflect a more indivisible existence. If the world were to draw the right lessons, then this experience has the potential to reframe the debate on global issues. But for that to happen, it is imperative to find more common ground on the very questions that are today sources of contention.

Perhaps the most unpredictable impact of the pandemic is on the political fortunes of those in the societies most severely affected. It goes without saying that regimes in office would be judged by the quality of their response. And that, in turn, could be influenced by the narratives they create. What we do know is that the economic devastation resulting from the coronavirus has fundamentally changed the political calculations that preceded it. But they should still be factored in, as some of the thought processes could outlive those who introduced it into the contemporary discourse. The expectation that we may easily return to the past was never really well-founded. The coronavirus has probably made it even more difficult.

So where does all of this leave India? It is a polity which would strengthen stability and add to reassurance at a time of global volatility. Its influence will contribute to world rebalancing and shape the pace of multipolarity, political or economic. Its strong bonding with the global South is critical to ensuring that developmental priorities and natural justice are not disregarded. As an advocate of reformed multilateralism, it can support genuine collective endeavours even in a more nationalistic era. And as a civilizational power coming back on the global stage, it would be another powerful example of return of history.

Today’s India also demonstrates that the spread of democracy can lead to a more vivid expression of beliefs and traditions. When combined with a strong determination to address neglected challenges of governance, this would inevitably generate new conversations. At the same time, India’s progress in social development has the potential to make it a key source of trusted talent for the global knowledge-based economy. These are some of the factors as the world examines the accommodation that will inevitably accompany India’s rise. How they deal with each other will reflect a mix of compulsions and convergences, whether they be of geopolitics, technology, markets or culture.

Naturally, India too will be shaped by the broad trends in the global environment that the coronavirus will intensify. But more than that, it needs to take into account the more direct consequences of the pandemic. Its destructive impact naturally demands a strategy of national revival. And that, in turn, warrants a fundamental rethink about our growth model. This was probably coming anyway, given how much the current economic framework has hollowed out our manufacturing capacities. In the context of the free trade agreements, there was already an ongoing debate about the adequacy of our preparations to engage the global economy more intensively. What was evident was that many concerns stemming from the policies of our partners remain unaddressed. Competing against those with structural advantages has been difficult, as evidenced by the growing trade deficit. Going further down that very pathway without a course correction has obvious implications. There are direct livelihood and social stability consequences. It is paradoxical that those urging India to be more open are themselves very sensitive on this score. A revival strategy, therefore, needs to be chalked out with the utmost deliberation. Whatever the choices we make on compatibility or engagement, there are some facts we simply cannot ignore.

As India has discovered in the past, economic strategies have to be in consonance not only with its own national situation, but the global one as well. If we are significantly out of step with the world, as we were by 1991, then they are difficult to sustain. Three decades later, India’s capabilities, competitiveness and trade are under stress, this time for very different reasons. The post-1991 belief that we could rely on the costing of others abroad to build our own businesses at home clearly has a high price. A lowest bidder syndrome and obsessive quest for profit margins has ended up eroding domestic capabilities. Even more, the efficiency of others, instead of spurring competitiveness, has actually led to putting off further reforms. Openness abroad ironically has led to stagnation at home, discouraging innovation and killing creativity. MSMEs have borne the brunt of the damage. While the pandemic may have brought out weaknesses pertaining to health security, it has also exposed this larger strategic complacency. Other domains struggle similarly with their own predicaments. Whether it is unfair advantages that competitors enjoy or the lack of a level playing field, we need to predicate policy on realities rather than rhetoric. And the access we give and the arrangements we enter into must take those into account.

If we are to take stock, it could begin with the realization that the world has been more protectionist and one-sided than we expected. Our trade figures tell their own tale. Continuing to follow the post-1991 mantras in such circumstances makes little sense. Both national circumstances and global situation call for a much greater emphasis on self-reliance (Atmanirbharta). Such a policy outlook would encourage approaches that would be more self-generating and self-sustaining. By its very performance, there would be greater innovation and creativity. It is only when its own production flourishes at home that India can make an economic difference abroad. Therefore, a greater emphasis on Make in India, obviously not just for India but for the world.

We must also be more caring of our own interests and support them to compete globally. And certainly, our home turf should not be left wide open to those who close their own so firmly. Where India is a late-starter, what it takes to catch up must always be factored into policies. And these must aggressively promote employment, skills, innovation and commercialization. As many other polities do, there must be no hesitation in standing up for sensitive sectors. The narrow economic interests that drove past policies cannot prevail over the welfare of the many. This is not to make a case for autarchy but to argue for a greater capacity-building so central to comprehensive national power. Current times clearly mandate that every nation must have cards to play in the global arena; big nations especially so.

As the world moves towards greater diversification, the case for enhanced participation in global value chains will strengthen further. India can move more purposefully in this direction, but it must balance that with building up its domestic capabilities. A more capable India that will emerge as a result of greater self-reliance will surely also have more to offer. Far from turning its back on the world, India is actually preparing to participate more but with better preparation. After all, Atmanirbhar Bharat does coexist with Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is a family).

Rising in the midst of global turbulence, a lot will depend on India’s ability to distinguish itself from others. The post-corona world is likely to see an even greater deficit in global goods. The demand for early responders and generous partners is therefore likely to be more. This was visible during the pandemic and Indian behaviour holds some clues to how it could develop further. By going the extra mile to provide medicines to more than 120 nations, two-thirds of them as grant, a clear message of internationalism was sent. Four medical missions were mounted in the same period to the Maldives, Kuwait, Mauritius and Comoros. In doing so, India not only established its credentials as the pharmacy of the world but also as a health security responder. Equally, what is evident is that greater Indian capacities will make themselves felt on world affairs as part of a conscious strategy.

The last few years have demonstrated a growing Indian capacity to contribute to the global discourse and make a difference to international outcomes. We have significantly shaped the connectivity debate and backed that up with a plethora of projects, including in our immediate neighbourhood. Our single-minded campaign against terrorism has brought that issue into sharp focus in key world forums. Where maritime security and HADR situations are concerned, India has emerged as a key player, especially in the Indian Ocean.

At the political level, our confidence in overcoming the hesitations of history has opened up new space. Strategic clarity has helped to exploit that more effectively. Overall, the Indian persona is much more in evidence in a variety of ways. Our footprint has visibly grown in Africa, as also in many other regions where past connections were weaker. Indeed, this combination of significant engagement and deeper collaboration that extends across continents prepares us for a global mindset. The world may be on the threshold of a new decade; but India is ready for the next phase of its own evolution.

The world we are poised to enter is a subject of intense argumentation. It is further complicated by transformational changes in politics, economics and technology. Coming to terms with the declining shelf-life of the old post-1945 order is itself difficult. It is a still bigger challenge to fully recognize the elements which drive the one in the making. Assumptions of various dimensions are being questioned, at home as well as abroad. What we can just about agree upon is that the world is in the midst of a real transition. And our reading of the directions we head is influenced by our own preferences, interests, viewpoints and hopes.

The India Way, especially now, would be more of a shaper or decider rather than just be an abstainer. This has been already visible on debates like climate change and connectivity. India must be a just and fair power as well, consolidating its position as a standard bearer of the global South. At home, it would not only address its developmental challenges more effectively but also acquire faster the characteristics of a modern society and nation state. And finally, the India Way would express its brand with growing confidence, whether in its civilizational attributes or in its contemporary achievements.

For an approach of self-reliance to succeed, it must be accompanied by a greater sense of self-confidence. In India’s case, the decisiveness with which it has addressed varied challenges in the last few years provides enough grounds for that. This mindset will be even more needed in the post-corona world of individualistic behaviour. Some of that would be expressed in an ability to set our own priorities and define our own solutions. But there will also be the pressures of a competitive world that go beyond convergence and transactions. Making its choices to advance its interests should come naturally to a polity so deeply steeped in an independent ethos. In the past, that may have made us an outlier. Today, it could well be the norm.

As we are regarded with greater interest by other societies, a natural consequence is to probe India’s likely approach to key contemporary issues. Our answers – indeed our conduct – in that regard will also define what is the India Way. Comparisons will inevitably be made as others try to fit us into a model. But as with our use of capabilities, the choices that we make would also have few precedents. In putting out our narrative, ethics, culture and history may constitute part of the answer. But there are more domains as well that are relevant. India cannot escape the ideological battles of the day, however complex they may be. Challenging orthodox beliefs and viewpoints will always be controversial. Especially, if a sense of morality is attributed to the past and change is made to look risky. Some of the sharper lines drawn recently may, however, get blurred as the post-corona world throws up new challenges. But on its part, a more confident India should take these debates in its stride as part and parcel of a larger global rebalancing.

The rise of India, like other aspects of international relations, is a story without an ending. It may not always unfold smoothly, sometimes for reasons that are beyond our control. But, each generation passes on the torch to the next, hopefully a little brighter. In that process we have to constantly remedy the past while preparing for the future. Sound policymaking, even in the best of times, is therefore an exercise of both review and planning. The corona experience, however, gives that an exceptional value as we prepare for a challenge that is truly without precedent. None of us could have foreseen the enormity of what has just happened or indeed its implications that are still unfolding. Who will be hit to what extent by the pandemic, and who will recover and reinvent are still question marks. But, despite such an extraordinary degree of uncertainty, India must stay with a game plan that remains valid even now. Its elements may be more complicated and its challenges more daunting. But a stronger competitive spirit and a sharper strategic sense will surely stand us in good stead.

The world is clearly not what it was until just recently. In its systemic impact, the coronavirus may be the most consequential global happening after 1945. In an immediate sense, it would add to global turbulence by encouraging policy departures across geographies. The paradox the world will confront is to seek change in the very order in which it is still deeply invested. Some have already mastered that art well, while others still struggle. A more fragmented, diffused and complicated future awaits, as all of us will now do our political sums differently.

The value of India in such global calculations is apparent. It will probably increase even further after the virus. So, let take it as a sign of the times that the world has discovered the virtue of Namaste, the India Way of greeting with folded hands.

Index

Abe, Shinzo

Act East policy

Afghanistan

and India

jihad

Soviet invasion

and United States

Africa

Afro-Asian solidarity, Bandung era

Air India aircraft bombing

America First

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

Anglo-American alliance

anti-piracy patrols

APEC Summit

Arthashastra

artificial intelligence

ASEAN

India partnership

maritime issues

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Ashgabat Agreement

Asian balance of power

Asian brotherhood

Asian financial crisis

Asian Games

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Australia

and the Indo-Pacific

authoritarian societies

Bagchi, P.C.

balance of payments crisis

balance of power

Bandung Conference

Bangladesh

creation of/war

and the Indo-Pacific

mass killings

Bay of Bengal

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Big Tech

bilateral imbalances

bilateralism versus globalism

BIMSTEC

bipolarity

Bose, Subhash Chandra

Boxer Rebellion

brand building, branding

Brazil

Brexit

BRICS

BRICS New Development Bank

Buddhism

Bush, George

Cambodia: mass killings

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

Chabahar port project

China

Americans

Cultural Revolution

economy

global strategy

India relations

boundary dispute

managing rise

maritime issue

Special Representatives mechanism

war

and Japan

modernization

nationalism

Pakistan relations, nuclear/defence collaboration

rise

statecraft

Tibet issue; Tibet move

USSR/Russia relations

attack on Vietnam and the West, ties

Vietnam

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Churchill, Winston

climate change

Clinton, Bill

Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure

coastal surveillance

Cold War

colonial domination

competition

competitive politics, competitiveness

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

connectivity. See also technology

Coronavirus pandemic

post-Corona recovery

cosmopolitanism

cost optimization

cost-benefit analysis

counterterrorism

cultural beliefs practices

cultural identities

cyber interventions

Daesh-Islamic State

decolonization

de-coupling

defence budgets of the world

defence preparedness

Delhi Metro Rail project

Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor

democracy, tolerance, pluralism

democratic practices, global credibility

democratization

demographics

Deng Xiaoping

development assistance

development partnerships

digitization

Doha Round of trade negotiations

domestic challenges

East Asia Summit (EAS)

ecological and environmental protection

economic crisis

economic distress

economic growth

economic interdependence

economic perspective

economic reforms

EEZ surveillance

European Union

Eurozone crisis

Fa Xian

FATF

Fiji: Indian relief operations

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

foreign policy, diplomacy

shift

uncertainty

France

fundamentalism and radicalism

Gandhi, Indira

Gandhi, Rajiv

geo-economics

geopolitical

balance

challenge

convergence

perspectives

of Sino-Indian relations

realities; stresses

geopolitics

Germany

global

capitalism

consciousness

contradictions

diplomacy

economy financial crisis

good knowledge economy; order

perception of India

politics power equations

power hierarchy

regimes and coalitions

strategic environment

supply chains technology, relevance of our talent uncertainty

globalization

Goa

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Gulf War

Haushofer, Karl

humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR)

Hyderabad

hydrography

India, balancing role

India-Africa Forum Summit

Indian Ocean

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)

Indian diaspora in Western societies

Indonesia

Indo-Pacific

Indo-Soviet Treaty. See also Soviet Union; Russia

Indo-US nuclear deal. See also United States

industrialization

infrastructure

maritime

intermediaries

international community

International Court of Justice

International Day of Yoga

international issues

international law and norms

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International North-South Transport Corridor

international organizations: Indian victory

International relations

International Solar Alliance

international system

dysfunctional

internet economy

Iran

India, relations. See also Chabahar port project

Iraq

Indian relief operations

US war

Islam

Islamic fundamentalism

Israel

Jammu and Kashmir

external pressure

illegal occupation by Pakistan/attack terrorism/secessionism

United Nations’ intervention

Japan

and India, relations

India, Japan and the Asian balance Indo-Pacific relations

Meiji Restoration in Japan

militarism

victory over Russia

and United Kingdom

Japan-America-India (JAI)

Japanese Peace Treaty

jointness, coordination and sharing

Kaladan project

Karakoram Highway

Kargil conflict

Kautilya

Khalistan movement

Khan, A.Q.

Khan, Ayub

Kissinger, Henry

Kotnis, Dr

Kyoto Protocol

Lee Kuan Yew

Libya

Lines of Credit

Look East policy

Mahabharata, resemblance to current world

Make in India programme

Malabar Exercise

Maldives

Indian relief operations

maritime

claims

domain

geography

infrastructure

outlook

security

trade

market economy

Maruti-Suzuki

Mauritius

maritime issues

Middle East

Millennium Development Goals

modernization

Modi, Narendra

Mujib, Sheikh

multilateralism

multipolarity

Myanmar (Burma)

maritime issues

NAFTA

Nalanda

Nathu La

national

divides

identities

interest integration

security

nationalism

Nehru, Jawaharlal

Neighbourhood First approach

Nimzowitsch, Aron

Nixon, Richard

non-alignment policy, India

non-proliferation

North Korea

North-East states

nuclear indecision

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

nuclear proliferation

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

Nuclear tests

1974

1998

opposed by US and China

Obama, Barack

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

openness, transparency and equality

operational costs

Pakistan

China’ support, relations

establishment of Chinese ports

India, relations/conflict

war

1971

Kargil

intrusions in Kashmir

protection for terrorism/cross-border terrorism

US’ support

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)

Pal, Justice Radhabinod

Palestine

Panipat syndrome

Partition of India

Patel, Vallabhbhai

Pearl Harbour

Permanent Five (US, Russia, China, UK and France)

pluralism

plurilateralism

polarization

political

challenges

credibility

divide

instability

Islam

rebalancing

romanticism

uncertainty and national fragility unpredictability

politics

competitive

domestic politics, inter-state relations

discontinuous

global

and identity

positive discrimination

power

differential

distribution, rebalancing

equations

global hierarchy

relations

structure

power sector, Indian-supported projects in African countries

project execution record

public opinion and the west

Putin, Vladimir

Quad

ReCAAPregime changes

regional: identities; politics; security

regionalism

risk aversion

risk-taking

Roosevelt, Franklin

rule of law

Russia

China, relations

India, relations

Indo-Pacific relations

Japan’s victory over

Russia-India-China grouping (RIC)

SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrine

Sanders, Bernie

sea lanes of communication

security challenges in Indian Ocean

Sekigahara, Japan

Seychelles: maritime issues

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore

Shimla agreement

Siachen glacier

Silk Road

Singapore Summit

Singapore

India, relations

maritime issues

Sittwe port

societal dynamics and mechanics of policymaking

socio-economic: transformation

socio-economics and geopolitics

South African Development Community (SADC)

South Asia

Chinese interest

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

South China Sea

South-East Asia

South Korea

South-South cooperation

sovereignty

violation of

Soviet Union (USSR)

Afghanistan invasion

break-up

and China

and Germany

India, relations

and the United States

Sri Lanka

establishment of Chinese ports

ethnic conflict

Indian peacekeeping intervention

maritime issues

state system in India

statecraft

Stillwell Road

strategic

autonomy

competition

complacency

convergence

deception

restraint

security

Sustainable Development Goals

Syria

Tagore, Rabindranath

Tashkent agreement

technology

American dominance

application

and demographic differentials, diffusion

sensitivity

terrorism

Third World solidarity

Tiananmen incident

Tibet, China’s move

Tiger economies

Tokyo Tribunal

trade disputes/wars

Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

Trans-Pacific Partnership

Trilateral Highway

Trump, Donald

Turkey

UNCLOS

unipolarity

United Kingdom

Germany conflict

India, relations

and the Indo-Pacific

United Nations

and the Kashmir issue

Security Council (UNSC)

Resolution 1172

United States

China, relations

rapprochement

global strategy

India relations

Howdy Modi event

and the Indo-Pacific

lost the optimism

nationalism

Pakistan, support to resource limitation

technology dominance

terrorists’ attack/11

unipolarity

USSR conflict/relations

Vietnam issue

withdrawal from Iraq

withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan

United States-China-Pakistan axis

Uri and Balakot responses

USSR. See Soviet Union

Vajpayee, Atal Bihari

Vietnam

Western

bias

bloc’s cultivation of China dominance/imperialism

nations and India, relations

paradigm

powers

Westernization

World Trade Organizations (WTO)

World War I

World War II

Xuan Zang

Y2K challenge

Yemen

Indian relief operations

Yugoslavia

Zhang Qian

Zhou Enlai

About the Book

The decade from the 2008 global financial crisis to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic has seen a real transformation of the world order. The very nature of international relations and its rules is changing before our eyes.

For India, this means optimal relationships with all the major powers to best advance its goals. It also requires a bolder and nonreciprocal approach to the immediate and extended neighbourhood. A global footprint is now in the making that leverages India’s greater capability and relevance, as well as its unique diaspora. This era of global upheaval entails greater expectations from India, putting it on the path to becoming a leading power.

In The India Way, S. Jaishankar, India’s Minister of External Affairs, analyses these challenges and spells out possible policy responses. In doing so, he is very conscious of balancing India’s national interest with international responsibilities. He places this thinking in the context of history and tradition, appropriate for a civilizational power that seeks to reclaim its place on the world stage.

About the Author

Dr S. Jaishankar is currently the External Affairs Minister of India and was appointed to that position in May 2019. He is a Member of Parliament in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) representing the state of Gujarat.

His career as a professional diplomat for more than four decades culminated with a three-year tenure as the Foreign Secretary from 2015 to 2018. During that period, he was also a member of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Space Commission.

Before that, he served as the Ambassador of India to the United States of America during the Obama Administration from 2013 to 2015. He moved there from China, where he was the longest serving Indian Ambassador, from 2009 to 2013. His other ambassadorial positions are those to Singapore from 2007 to 2009 and to the Czech Republic from 2000 to 2004.

Earlier diplomatic assignments included those in Moscow, Washington DC and Colombo as a Political Officer, Budapest as a Commercial Counsellor and Tokyo as the Deputy Chief of Mission. In the Ministry of External Affairs, he was the Head of the Americas Division from 2004 to 2007 and Director of the East Europe Division from 1993 to 1994. He also served as the Press Secretary to the President of India from 1994 to 1996.

After his diplomatic career, he was President (Global Corporate Affairs) at Tata Sons Private Limited during 2018-19.

Dr S. Jaishankar is a graduate of St Stephen’s College at the University of Delhi. He has an MA in Political Science and an MPhil and PhD in International Relations on nuclear diplomacy from Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi.

He was a recipient of the Padma Shri award in 2019.

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First published in India in 2020 by

HarperCollins Publishers

A-75, Sector 57, Noida, Uttar Pradesh 201301, India

www.harpercollins.co.in

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Copyright © S. Jaishankar 2020

P-ISBN: 978-93-5357-979-1

Epub Edition © August 2020 ISBN: 978-93-9016-387-8

The views and opinions expressed in this book are the author’s own and the facts are as reported by him, and the publishers are not in any way liable for the same.

S. Jaishankar asserts the moral right

to be identified as the author of this work.

All rights reserved under The Copyright Act, 1957. By payment of the required fees, you have been granted the nonexclusive, nontransferable right to access and read the text of this ebook on-screen. No part of this text may be reproduced, transmitted, downloaded, decompiled, reverse-engineered, or stored in or introduced into any information storage and retrieval system, in any form or by any means, whether electronic or mechanical, now known or hereinafter invented, without the express written permission of HarperCollins Publishers India.

Cover design: Gavin Morris

Cover image: Getty Images

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